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 The expression “political concepts” refers to a set of concepts essential to any 
serious reflection on political life. This set includes authority, democracy, equality, 
freedom, justice, power and further concepts that represent fundamental political values 
and principles. Indeed, dictionaries of political thought in no small part consist of entries 
on terms that signify such central concepts. An expanded list would comprise 
conservatism, socialism, representation, the separation of powers, the welfare state, 
multiculturalism, public opinion and numerous other concepts in the realm of ideologies 
and institutions. They, too, form important building blocks of modern political thought.  
Those who have explicitly theorized political concepts in recent times, however, 
have claimed that we should view definitions of these concepts as contributions to 
ongoing debates. Instead of assuming that such concepts can be clearly characterized and 
delimited, they have studied how the meanings and uses of words that refer to crucial 
concepts are frequently subject to dispute. The way that someone explains a concept such 
as democracy or justice is rarely politically neutral. Political concepts are contested; 
opposing groups invoke them but put forward different definitions and seek to promote 
their interpretations at the expense of others.  
According to this view, political concepts are political in a double sense: they 
constitute central ideas, issues or arrangements of great political relevance, but the 
meanings of the concepts are topics of perpetual argument. Students of the political 
vocabulary will therefore encounter “microcosms” of disagreement and rivalry within 
concepts (Connolly 1993: 225). We need a shared stock of concepts to reflect upon 
political principles, institutions, movements, or tendencies, but these very concepts tend 
also to be drawn into and affected by our conflicts. Political concepts are not simply used 
to describe political life, but significant sites of political disagreement. 
Even when people seem to agree on conceptual definitions in the abstract, the way 
they use concepts to categorize and assess the world can be designed to shape attitudes 
and perceptions. It matters, for instance, whether one calls a series of events that leads to 
a regime change a coup or a revolution, or presents a relationship between an employer 
and an employee as a case of exchange or exploitation. The words attached to concepts 
can be mobilized to make politically salient a reality that was previously seen as a domain 
untouched by discord. Indeed, the concepts of politics and the political have often been 
used to initiate fresh debates about social arrangements, as in the formulation “the 
personal is political.” In other words, concepts are means to instigate and conduct 
political struggles. And if successful, initially controversial but recurrent uses of key 
words such as exploitation or politics in new contexts may eventually find broader 
acceptance and shift what is perceived as the concept’s proper domain of application.  
The expression political concepts may ultimately point to concepts that have been 
molded by myriad political moves, such as strategic redefinitions, polemical attacks, 
attempted appropriations of negative labels, and so on. Theorists of political concepts and 
historians of concepts often aim to show how political disputes contribute to the very 
process of concept formation and alteration. The appeal of such an approach should be 
apparent: those who write about political concepts maintain that the practice of politics 
itself helps generate the concepts with which it is interpreted. The concepts belong in the 
domain of political action.  
In sum, most accounts of political concepts assume that the significance and scope 
of important concepts are continually negotiated through contentious interactions. This 
approach to political concepts rests on assumptions about the nature of agency, politics 
and language. The theorists of political concepts typically care about and believe in the 
efficacy of human agents who step into the public domain to justify political projects 
through speech and action; they associate or even equate politics with conflict and 
contestation and in some cases tend to value the existence of agonistic relationships; they 
emphasize the pragmatic dimension of language according to which words and phrases 
that express concepts are means to achieve particular objectives; and they assert that 
terms for concepts entangled in long-term disputes elude endeavors to establish stable 
definitions and instead require genealogical reconstructions, which trace the complicated 
histories of ostensibly trans-historical values and phenomena.   
These features set the study of political concepts apart from more rationalist 
projects to remove contestability from concepts by establishing clear and unequivocal 
descriptions. For the theorists of political concepts, the existence of conflicting 
definitions or quarrels over application is not necessarily a nuisance and may resist 
elimination. The study of political concepts also deviates from investigations into larger 
structures such as belief systems or socio-economically determined ideologies that seem 
to diminish the importance of agency enacted in local disputes and through rhetorical 
moves. This could be seen as a weakness, for the focus on a small number of political 
concepts may seem to lead to an incomplete grasp of the forces that shape political 
action. From a critical perspective, students of political concepts may appear to 
overestimate the significance of a few conspicuous terms in relation to the vast web of 
communications or the underlying paradigms of thought in which individual concepts 
play a role.   
 
Political-Polemical Concepts: Carl Schmitt 
In The Concept of the Political (1927/1932) and other works, the German political 
and legal theorist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) took steps toward a theory of political 
concepts. Schmitt notoriously claims that politics occurs through the emergence of a clear 
distinction between friend and enemy. The genuinely political situation erupts when 
cohesive groups crystallize through fierce conflict shadowed by the possibility of actual 
physical combat. In this framework, the concept of the political does not point to any 
particular domain or substance, but rather the degree of intensity of associations and 
dissociations among bounded groups of individuals, regardless of what religious, social, 
economic or ideological issue initially kindled the struggle between them.  
Schmitt’s concept of the political provides the backdrop to his definition of the 
political concept. For Schmitt, political concepts are concepts that are used against 
specific enemies. Every political concept, he writes, is a polemical concept. The words 
that signify such concepts do not simply refer to a political practice or evoke a political 
ideal but are introduced in order to refute, marginalize or discredit an adversary. In The 
Concept of the Political, Schmitt does list concepts traditionally conceived as political, 
such as absolutism, dictatorship, class, republic, and state, but he does so not because 
they belong to a set of concepts perennially relevant to politics. Rather, they deserve their 
label only when they are employed to strengthen or weaken positions in a conflict 
between emerging factions.  
For Schmitt, political concepts are best called political-polemical concepts, and he 
offers a few examples of how such concepts appear in attacks leveled at particular 
opponents. Schmitt claims, for instance, that the concept of the sovereign state was 
originally crafted to polemicize against those who espoused established notions of royal 
or princely sovereignty. The doctrine of state sovereignty, he continues, would be 
mysterious if one did not understand against whom this doctrine was first principally 
directed, namely the person of the monarch. Opposing monarchical rule, jurists tried to 
wrest sovereignty from the person of the sovereign and transfer it to the impersonal state. 
Sophisticated propagandists created an important political concept when they needed it in 
an ongoing battle, although these initial circumstances may have been forgotten.  
In another context, Schmitt mentions how socialists in the Weimar Republic 
suggested that the sums paid by renters to landlords should be called tribute instead of 
rent. The socialist writers’ motivation behind this suggested terminological change was to 
make the public view supposedly legal or economic relationships of exchange as 
relationships of hierarchy and subordination, which would harm the reputation of owners. 
A novel application of an established concept was meant to induce people to reclassify 
everyday social relations in a politically charged way.  
One of Schmitt’s main examples of a polemically loaded concept is the concept of 
the political itself. He notes that people often condemn others as motivated by political 
concerns and portray themselves as entirely unpolitical, insinuating that their opponents 
are prone to descend into petty quarrels or grubby fights over privileges whereas they 
merely seek solutions to problems. The terms political and unpolitical come with multiple 
associations and connotations that can be used politically, by which Schmitt means that 
they can be deployed to disqualify and denounce an enemy.   
Schmitt defines political concepts as those concepts that agents construct or 
redeploy to achieve political ends in concrete contexts structured by friend-enemy 
divisions; they are political tools or even weapons. This basic theory of political concepts 
has, Schmitt notes, implications for the student of political thought. The historical 
significance and even the precise meaning of ostensibly enduring concepts such as 
democracy or freedom will elude readers who do not discern the polemical character they 
assume when they are absorbed by the politics of the day. And one can best uncover this 
political-polemical character of concepts by identifying the central tensions between 
enemy camps. Who, one should presumably ask, is introducing or applying this concept 
to discredit or undermine support for whom? Specifically, one can only fully understand 
the political work performed by a concept when one is familiar with the alternative 
concepts that the speaker or writer is trying to suppress, discard or replace (the concept of 
the sovereign state seeks to weaken the association between sovereignty and the 
monarch). A political concept is, according to Schmitt’s reasoning, typically a concept 
pitted against other concepts, or it constitutes a counter-concept and is in this way 
enmeshed in political struggles.  
The distinctive feature of political concepts is, according to Schmitt, that they 
possess a certain force, or even punch, derived from their position in a conceptual 
antithesis ultimately rooted in the vision of an imminent clash between distinct groups. 
Schmitt even indicates that only political struggles between demarcated collectives infuse 
concepts with the fullness of meaning, without which they are nothing but spectral 
abstractions. Sharp political contrasts are what lend concepts significance in the double 
sense of clear meaning and heightened vividness.  
Yet Schmitt also notes that a politically dominant group may want to present its 
language as an undisputed vocabulary of neutral terms. It is often advantageous to offer 
one’s statements as mere descriptions of an objectively present terrain or encapsulations 
of commonsensical principles rather than as targeted attacks or maledictions. As a 
politically engaged scholar and theorist, Schmitt himself therefore seeks to recover 
disavowed or faded antagonisms and expose the concealed polemical meanings of 
concepts assumed to be neutrally descriptive categories. In this way, Schmitt’s perhaps 
inchoate theory of political or politicized concepts points to the necessity of conceptual 
history that can reveal how actors who need stirring words and compelling ideas in their 
polemical engagements with each other drive the formation of political concepts.   
 
Essentially Contested Concepts: W. B. Gallie 
In a lecture held in 1956, the British philosopher W. B. Gallie (1912-1998) 
introduced the idea of essentially contested concepts, which has since inspired numerous 
political theorists to offer elaborations and refinements. In his talk, Gallie set out to 
identify the features of concepts that attract endless disputes over their proper meaning 
and correct use. Concepts such as democracy or social justice are widely shared and often 
deemed pivotal by those who invoke them, but people do not agree on their meanings and 
implications. No usage can be set up as the standard one. Central concepts in politics are 
thus likely to become focal points of intractable disputes. The concepts are political in 
that they become zones of chronic and deep-running disagreements.  
Gallie lists a series of features that characterize the essentially contested concept. 
The concept is typically appraisive or signifies some valued achievement; the valued 
achievement captured by the concept must be internally complex so that different users 
can emphasize different aspects and offer diverging descriptions and explanations of its 
worth; the concept is open in that it can be applied to new and unforeseen circumstances. 
Gallie thus points to concepts that represent something of great value to most speakers, 
but that are nevertheless multifaceted, even when people can agree that some particular 
exemplar represents an embodiment of the notion.  
A concept such as democracy, for instance, names an achievement or principle 
held in high esteem by a great number of people, who will appeal to the concept in their 
reasoning on political matters. At the same time, opposing groups can apply the concept 
to different arrangements, select and articulate different criteria to delineate what counts 
as an acceptable realization of democracy, and attack each other for misunderstanding or 
abusing the term. As a result, we can expect never-ending fights over the concept.  
In the case of social justice, Gallie’s other main example, he discerns two 
opposing definitions that he associates with commutation and distribution, respectively. 
One contemporary camp maintains that justice consists in arrangements that allow 
individuals to secure resources based on their achievements, whereas the other ties the 
concept of justice to the provision of necessary goods to every member of society. Rather 
than reconstruct and assess the arguments for and against these opposing understandings 
of social justice, Gallie notes that they both spring from venerable traditions of moral 
teaching and remain recognizable to people in their daily lives. Gallie’s point is that 
social justice is a concept shared by individuals located at different points on a political 
spectrum, that it can be understood and applied in different ways by speakers who 
emphasize different facets, that each such interpretation can be sustained by respectable 
arguments, and that the internal ranking of these interpretations cannot be settled once 
and for all. Again, the consequence is interminable dispute. 
When opponents articulate their understanding of concepts such as democracy or 
social justice, they marshal arguments, but there is, according to Gallie, no general 
principle for deciding which understanding should prevail over the other. Gallie does 
admit of one major objection to this account of essentially contested concepts, namely 
that the disputes over the proper use of one concept are due to confusion of several 
concepts that could in principle be distinguished from one another. On this view, 
quarreling groups could come to see through a process of clarification and disaggregation 
that they happen to be using a single word for what are in fact two or more discrete 
concepts. The widespread reliance on one term then conceals the possibility of the 
consistent use of multiple concepts that should be held apart. But Gallie contends that 
parties will be reluctant to abandon the cherished word, often claim to sustain and 
develop a common tradition neatly encapsulated by it, and even seek to anchor their use 
by references to a shared exemplar (such as the Athenian polis or the American 
Revolution). The contending parties would not accept the work of tidy conceptual 
separation as a genuine solution.   
For concepts such as democracy, justice, power, freedom, and equality, discord 
proves irrepressible because of these concepts’ inherently complex and open character. 
Gallie further claims that the persons who employ the words that signify these concepts 
are hardly unaware of the ongoing rivalries; they know that to use an essentially 
contested concept means to enter a competitive field and deploy it aggressively and 
defensively against opposing factions. People acknowledge that a given concept has 
inspired multiple interpretations but try to fix the criteria of its application and make their 
own use the most broadly recognized one. Their aim is precisely to achieve a 
decontestation of the contested concept, or narrow down the range of perceived 
alternative interpretations. Gallie expresses the hope that awareness of competing uses 
will compel contestants to sharpen the quality of their arguments, but concedes that once 
concepts are understood as essentially rather than contingently contested, many will 
relinquish their attempts at persuasion and concentrate on damning the dissenters.  
 
Essentially Contested Concepts: Responses and Developments 
In his seminal essay on essentially contested concepts, W. B. Gallie claimed that 
disputes over the meaning and proper use of central evaluative concepts in political 
philosophy are not amenable to any final and conclusive resolution. Since its publication, 
his argument has been a source of inspiration – and of irritation – for political theorists. 
Critics such as John Gray have been concerned that Gallie’s view inevitably leads to 
relativism. When Gallie asserts that the debates surrounding a particular concept cannot 
be decided by rational argument, Gray and others claim that he surrenders the means of 
evaluating the relative validity of different interpretations and would be forced to accept 
the most idiosyncratic usages, even as he continues to speak of how disputants can 
mobilize respectable reasons. Others, such as Ernest Gellner, have maintained that 
Gallie’s account captures the nature of conceptual controversies in a way that does not 
preclude structured deliberations. Although there may be no single correct definition of a 
political concept, not all usages will appear equally acceptable; it is just that continuous 
debate constitutes the real life of the concept. Gallie’s formulation economically sums up 
the “endemic litigation-proneness” of concepts shared and treasured by antagonistic 
political agents (Gellner 1974: 100).  
In consequence, many thinkers have sought to preserve Gallie’s central insight 
and explore its implications. William Connolly has presented Gallie’s notion of 
essentially contested concepts as a challenge for the social sciences. According to 
Connolly, social and political scientists typically strive to establish a set of terms, the 
clarity and precision of which make them acceptable to any investigator regardless of his 
or her politics or normative commitments. They cannot, however, hope to insulate their 
definitions from the conceptual contests. It is, Connolly asserts, impossible to forge a 
purely technical terminology of political inquiry out of the normative and evaluative 
language of politics, or impossible to define and analyze democracy, interest, or power 
without making some implicit judgment on political practices. As a result, social scientist 
cannot draw an absolutely clear distinction between describing political life and 
participating in it.      
Michael Freeden and others have argued that single contested concepts should not 
be studied in isolation, but are best construed as elements in more comprehensive systems 
of ideas, or ideologies. A certain interpretation of democracy, for instance, is linked to 
particular conceptions of freedom, justice, and power, all of which are also essentially 
contested concepts. The dispute over a particular concept is rarely a localized conflict but 
typically involves entire networks composed of tightly interrelated and mutually 
supportive ideas. Gallie’s study, as well as any other study of political concepts, is 
therefore only the first step toward an understanding of the more encompassing patterns 
of thought that specify the role and meaning of the assembled concepts and give form to 
attitudes in political life.  
Further, Terrence Ball has pointed out that an essentially contested concept is not 
necessarily incessantly contested. While the concept’s meaning and use might in 
principle be open to contestation, actual rancorous disputes can come to an end or be 
temporarily closed off depending on the political situation. Finally, Gellner suggests that 
frequent contests around multiple concepts may be indicative of more open and 
politically diverse societies, whose members encounter each other in debate and at least 
formally uphold the idea that reason-based conversions are possible. In other words, 
openly conducted struggles over concepts tell us something about the social and political 
conditions in which they take place. Essentially contested concepts reveal themselves as 
such in more pluralist climates.   
 
Political Concepts and Ordinary Language Use: Hanna Pitkin 
  Theorists of political concepts hold that disagreements are intrinsic to politics and 
likely to become manifest in disputes over conceptual meaning. A question that follows is 
then how political philosophers can productively clarify conceptual arguments while 
remaining sensitive to deep-seated differences, perhaps by separating mere confusions 
from genuine conflicts. While not the work of a self-described theorist of political 
concepts, Hanna Pitkin’s (1931-) study The Concept of Representation from 1967 
nonetheless provides a possible model for how a careful exploration of conceptual 
meaning can elucidate, if not resolve, conceptual controversies.   
Piktin shows that the concept of representation has received a series of diverse 
and incompatible treatments, by canonical political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes 
as well as more contemporary political scientist. Some assume, for instance, that 
relationships of representation consist in accurate resemblance between the representative 
and the represented, whereas others focus on how legitimate representation comes into 
being through formal procedures of authorization, regardless of any meaningful likeness 
between the involved parties.  
Given the multiple definitions, it is not surprising that political representatives are 
judged according to different standards. Representatives who do not closely follow 
instructions from constituencies can be cast as covert oligarchs who betray the very 
people they are meant to represent, whereas delegates who never stray from carrying out 
orders can be dismissed as mere tools. Pitkin herself eventually seeks to convert these 
opposing views into coexisting limits on the acceptable use of the concept. A 
representative should indeed be neither an oligarch nor a mere tool; the bond of 
representation exists only when the autonomy of the representative is reconciled with 
responsiveness to the represented, a paradoxical requirement that makes representation a 
precarious political institution.  
Yet Pitkin’s mode of analysis in her work on the concept of representation can be 
advanced as a generally applicable procedure. When facing conceptual disputes, Pitkin 
claims, a return to the single, basic definition of the concept in question may accomplish 
little. Instead she argues for a patient exploration of how the word taken to signify a 
political concept is ordinarily used by speakers in a range of contexts (a flag represents a 
country by symbolizing it; a map represents a territory by selectively depicting it; an 
attorney represents a client by acting in his or her stead and so on). Through such an 
examination of the varied and subtle nuances in the grammar of everyday language, 
Pitkin suggests, one discovers that theorists and scholars of representation often derive 
their conceptions from established uses of the word, but tend to generalize too widely 
from a small set of examples. For instance, it is not wrong to view representation in terms 
of resemblance between the representative and the represented, but this partial view, 
founded in a particular bundle of word uses, should not eclipse the many other contexts 
and ways in which the concept is routinely deployed. Particular interpretations of 
representation as a political concept have rarely been entirely false, but frequently one-
sided.  
Much like the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pitkin implies that a complex 
concept such as representation is not quite one single thing, but should be approached as 
a conglomerate of ways of speaking. To arrive at a better understanding of a political 
concept such as representation, one must seek to make explicit how the speakers of a 
language are already using the word, and not expect to encounter a perfectly uniform 
employment. Conceptual disputes arise so easily and seem so irresolvable because the 
meanings of concepts are in fact highly complex compounds of many and varied 
instances of use. A lucid overview of language use will not eliminate political conflicts 
between camps with different interests and commitments, but may help reframe 
entrenched positions as partially valid extrapolations from shared but varied ways of 
speaking.  
 
Political Concepts and Conceptual History 
The theoreticians of political concepts believe that concepts serve as sites and 
instruments of political struggle. Political agents seek to advance their own 
interpretations of hallowed but multifaceted concepts as the only valid definitions, or they 
appropriate loaded terms to redescribe events and arrangements in ways designed to 
make them matters of debate. Since political actors in conflict with one another use 
established concepts creatively when they define and announce positions, and since the 
constellation of political forces tends to shift over long periods, the way that central 
concepts are understood is likely to change. The focus on the political character of 
complex concepts leads one to consider the mutability of meaning over time; concepts 
vigorously fought over will have histories. There is a connection between theories of 
political concepts and studies in conceptual history. 
Students of political concepts, then, do not set out to determine one single, 
coherent meaning of a concept that every reasonable person ought to accept. Instead, they 
construe definitions as moves in the contexts of ongoing political arguments and gather 
and exhibit multiple and conflicting descriptions, in the present and throughout history. 
They assume that politically active agents redefine concepts and apply the words that 
signify them to new or different circumstances, and that this might occur with special 
frequency and verve in turbulent times, when new tendencies require a refreshed political 
vocabulary. The theorists of political concepts might approvingly cite Nietzsche’s dictum 
that “only that which has no history is definable.” 
 
Conceptual History in the German Context: Reinhart Koselleck 
In the German context, the leading proponent and practitioner of conceptual 
history is Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), who also knew and was inspired by Carl 
Schmitt, but who belonged to an ideologically re-educated post-1945 generation and did 
not share his authoritarian views. Koselleck’s work provides a clear example of the 
connection between the theory of political concepts and conceptual history. Apart from 
conducting his own diachronic studies of particular concepts (such as crisis or Bildung) 
and publishing theoretical reflections on conceptual history, he served as the main 
director of a lexicon that aimed to present the deep historical existence of so-called basic 
concepts [Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe]. Published in seven volumes over a period of 
two decades (1972-1992), the lexicon consists of more than a hundred entries, some of 
which are the length of a standard monograph.  
The lexicon covers constitutional concepts (such as sovereignty or separation of 
powers), key words of political, social, and economic organization (such as party, system, 
or trade union), the central concepts and slogans of modern political movements (such as 
communism, critique, or progress) and the designations of major occupations and societal 
strata (such as class). This compelled the authors to deal with a host of traditional, even 
ancient terms that have remained relevant in new circumstances, words that continue to 
be used but have been infused with discrepant conceptual meanings over time, and 
suddenly appearing neologisms that transport novel concepts, all in order to determine 
both the continuities and discontinuities that characterize the modern political vocabulary.  
In the course of supervising the lexicon project, Koselleck formulated a 
rudimentary theory of the political concept. He separated the concept from the technical 
and well-defined term by arguing that concepts are concentrates of multiple significances 
and resonances that embody a complex historical reality in the process of transition. 
Further, he claimed that linguistically embodied political concepts are not just indicators 
that point to a set of conditions, but also factors or contributors in processes of change, 
insofar as agents use them as instruments to interpret and shape their situation. Finally, he 
noted that semantic struggles – whether in the form of conflicting attempts to determine 
the meaning of a single concept or controversies over how events, groups, and activities 
should be named and categorized – are likely to increase in frequency in times of great 
societal transformations. When the world changes, inherited concepts are destabilized.    
Koselleck’s discussion of the political concept is in fact geared towards the 
historical study of modernity’s emergence. He wants to reconstruct conceptual shifts in 
order to trace the major socio-political trends in European history. A much-abbreviated 
example can serve to illustrate how conceptual history tracks the changing meaning of 
key words to show how semantic shifts make manifest societal change. In the seventeenth 
century, the German word Bürger signified the town-dweller, a person who enjoyed 
certain rights and privileges as an inhabitant of a recognized city. In the eighteenth 
century, however, the Bürger ceased to be the name for a particular and localized estate 
and became the general title for the citizen of a state; the concept widened and was 
democratized. In the nineteenth century, the conceptual meaning and resonances of this 
word changed yet again, in conjunction with emerging antagonisms. The Bürger became 
an economically defined figure, a member of the bourgeoisie, associated with ownership. 
According to socialists, the collective of Bürger stood against the proletariat in a conflict 
of world-historical import. In this way, the chain of redefinitions of a single key word 
mirrors politically crucial developments: the dissolution of an older order of manifold 
estates, the rise of increasingly democratic nation states, and the formation of a class-
based society with its attendant ideologies.  
For Koselleck, conceptual history studies the formation of new political 
vocabularies that in turn disclose tendencies specific to modernity. His guiding thesis is 
that modern political concepts are quite different in character from those of the pre-
revolutionary period of the Old Regime in Europe: they no longer belong to the world of 
an elite but are familiar to broader public spheres; they are typically unmoored from any 
particular place in shared social life and instead appear as mobile abstractions; and they 
are informed by a perception of human history as non-cyclical and endowed with a 
forward movement towards a more ideal state. For instance, in Roman law, emancipation 
denoted the release of a young man at the threshold of maturity from out of the domain of 
the father. In the modern period, however, emancipation gradually advanced from its 
function as a circumscribed legal term to become a name for the self-liberation of entire 
classes, religious communities or nations, subtended by a vision of an historical 
movement towards greater equality. The concept attached to the word emancipation thus 
expanded and became suffused with a veritable philosophy of history.  
Indeed, Koselleck is perhaps most known for his studies of how modern concepts 
such as development, progress or revolution emerge as instruments of anticipation and 
evocation meant to generate solidarity in large populations. He conceives of conceptual 
history as a method with which to register the disjunction of the past and the future in the 
modern period, or to show how people’s horizon of expectation began to drift away from 
their space of experience towards the end of the eighteenth century. In this context, 
Koselleck pays special attention to the emergence of what he terms collective singulars, 
grand concepts designed to encompass and unite manifold events and actions that were 
previously not thought of as instantiations of a single process. In the period before the 
end of the Ancien Regime, for instance, there was only a plurality of individual histories, 
the history of Gustavus Adolphus, the history of France and so on. In the post-
revolutionary situation, however, thinkers increasingly spoke about history in the 
singular, as one unified medium for everything that occurs, or a chain of events with an 
overarching logic. An apparently small modification, from histories to history, signals a 
momentous conceptual transformation.  
In his study of concepts as indicators and factors in the historical process, 
Koselleck is intent upon showing how the very character of vital political concepts 
undergoes systematic changes in modernity. In an historical light, emancipation, 
progress, revolution, and other concepts that partly compose the current political 
vocabulary seem future-oriented and abstract, no longer nourished by actual past 
experience. As such, post-revolutionary concepts are symptoms and vehicles of a 
specifically modern outlook. Like Schmitt, Koselleck believes that political concepts 
must be understood against the background of shifting political contexts, but he also 
claims that conceptual history reveals how modern political concepts are fundamentally 
distinct: they reveal that modern politics always takes place on a world-historical stage.   
 
Conceptual History in the British Context: Quentin Skinner 
 Conceptual historians have revealed how the conduct of politics itself informs 
concept formation and alteration throughout Western political history. In the British or 
Anglophone context, Quentin Skinner (1940-), an intellectual historian with a focus on 
the political thought of the early modern period and a member of the so-called Cambridge 
School, stands out as an important contributor to the political history of concepts. While 
Skinner has not seen himself as a practitioner of conceptual history as a distinct 
discipline, he has nonetheless supplied theoretical refinements as well as particular 
examples to the study of how concepts are formed and reformed in historically specific 
argumentative exchanges among political opponents.   
Skinner’s additions to the study of conceptual history are partly rooted in his 
familiarity with two approaches to language use, British philosophy of language as 
represented by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and J. L. Austin’s How to Do 
Things With Words, on the one hand, and classical rhetoric, on the other. In these 
admittedly different traditions, Skinner has found means to describe how the linguistic 
utterances of political writers and thinkers are best understood as actions in particular 
contexts. Rather than seek to arrive at the best or most valid definition of any concept, 
Skinner argues that the historian ought to reconstruct what politically involved authors 
aimed to achieve with their various statements, as they were pursuing specific objectives 
in ongoing political disputes. In his analyses, Skinner follows Wittgenstein’s adage that 
“words are deeds.”  
Skinner’s guiding idea that language is above all used by politically interested 
thinkers to achieve pragmatic ends, such as justifying a political viewpoint or 
undermining a previously self-evident position, is consistent with other, earlier 
theoreticians of political concepts. Schmitt and others share the intuition that political 
concepts are concepts used as instruments of debate to promote or discredit practices. 
With his philosophical background, however, Skinner could introduce a more technical 
vocabulary to speak of how words are used in politics. Specifically, Skinner referred to 
Austin’s notion of speech acts to draw attention to the action completed by a verbal 
proposition. When a political writer praises someone as courageous, he or she is not 
simply describing someone’s traits accurately or inaccurately, but actively putting him or 
her up as a paragon of virtue, or advancing one set of values over another. Utterances 
must be treated as actions performed in order to achieve the agent’s intentions. 
The idea that utterances constitute actions in particular contexts helps narrow the 
perceived gap between the politician and the political thinker, who could easily be 
misconstrued as an aloof philosopher rather than a problem-solver embroiled in 
contemporary conflicts. Skinner accordingly does not view the history of political 
thought as the series of interconnected answers that an exclusive group of prominent 
philosophers have thought up in response to eternal questions. Instead, he argues that this 
history has a more episodic character, in which thinkers respond to the exigencies of their 
time and place and deal with pressing issues and tendencies while relying on the 
conceptual resources at hand. The scholar can only recover the sense of how classic texts 
were attempts to solve local problems by placing them in the reconstructed context of 
numerous non-classical or more ephemeral contributions. If theoretical arguments and 
seminal definitions of key political concepts assume form in battles fought out among 
numerous politicking agents, the historian must survey the entire battlefield.  
Skinner’s approach is to some extent followed through in his studies on the 
emergence of the concept of the state, which in the eighteenth century had emerged as the 
master noun of political argument. Skinner is interested in the long process through 
which a word, the state, came to denote a distinct impersonal authority that alone wields 
legitimate force within a delimited territory, thus signaling people’s clear and self-
conscious possession of a more modern state concept. And it turns out that the emergence 
of this state concept is inseparable from waves of debate between schools of political 
thought supporting different causes.  
Skinner begins with the word status, which in the early modern period was 
typically used in reference to the standing, eminence or reputation of a prince as a person 
and hence was not the name for a particular constitutional and legal order. Yet over time, 
the discussion of the advantageous standing of a prince became increasingly entwined 
with his ability to maintain his position as a ruler and preserve an existing regime, namely 
his own. The word state, previously simply the current position of the prince, thus 
became associated with an existing regime, with a general area over which power could 
be exercised, and finally also the means of coercive control that serve to organize and 
maintain order. Such slippages were promoted and exploited by Renaissance champions 
of republics who were critical of princely domination. Yet later thinkers such as Hobbes, 
who disapproved of the identification of the state with a people in a region, helped move 
the concept of the state towards greater impersonality by arguing that the state 
represented a structure of power independent of both a particular ruler and of the people. 
In the flow of such arguments, the state finally appeared as a doubly impersonal entity, 
tied neither to a particular ruler nor to the people over which its powers could be 
exercised. Skinner argues that the modern concept of the state as an apparatus of power 
and an enduring fictional person was the result, or even the unintended by-product, of 
multiple disputatious episodes over the legitimate sources of law and objects of 
allegiance in which the term state was being used in new and extended ways. Generations 
of political struggles partly carried out by philosophers gave shape to a pivotal concept.   
Skinner’s study shows that he approaches concept formation from the perspective 
of active political life. Conceptual development, such as the evolution of the impersonal 
state concept from out of the vocabulary of princely rule, involves writers attuned to the 
issues of their age trying to tweak an established terminology until new conceptual 
meanings have become accepted. In general, Skinner focuses on what thinkers can 
possibly achieve with the vocabularies they have inherited, how far concepts can be 
stretched through previously untried applications, and pays special attention to cunning 
rhetorical moves that introduce new political projects in ways that do not violate common 
perceptions.  
Interested in persuasion, few politically motivated writers can afford to depart 
entirely from conventions of usage and instead seek to revise them. Skinner also notes 
that such attempts to take cover under already established concepts and commonplaces 
are not always successful. In the sixteenth century, champions of commerce eager to 
legitimize their practices began to speak of care and prudence in monetary affairs as a 
form of religious commitment. But they failed to convince people of the pious character 
of business, with the result that the term religious simply took on the added meaning of 
diligence and could be used in a novel and separate way. In this case, people did not 
begin to recognize business practices as genuine manifestations of devoutness and the 
concept of religiousness split into piety and mere diligence. The current multiple uses of 
the word religious represent a record of a failed attempt at persuasion. In this way, 
lexicon entries bear the traces of past political campaigns. And this captures one of the 
points of conceptual history, as practiced both in the Anglophone sphere and on the 
European continent: the political concept lives a fully political life, in that its meanings 
and accepted range of reference is not settled outside the domain of ongoing political 
speech and action.  
 
Summary 
Studies devoted to the idea of political concepts aim to demonstrate how concepts 
are both instruments of and arenas for political activity. W. B. Gallie and others have 
given crucial political concepts such as democracy, freedom, justice, and power the title 
essentially contested concepts; politically motivated disputes over their meaning cannot 
be laid to rest and the resulting, apparently interminable arguments are intrinsic to 
political philosophy. There is no neutral set of concepts with which one can parse 
politics, key terms are themselves subject to contention.  
In line with this insight, conceptual historians argue that many important concepts 
such as state, sovereignty and emancipation have only emerged and assumed their current 
sense through a succession of political arguments and confrontations. Politics, as it is 
actively practiced in statements, manifestos, editorials, and philosophical texts, help draw 
and redraw conceptual boundaries. To be sure, much of political life consists not in 
contesting formed concepts or constructing new ones, but in applying agreed-upon and 
cherished notions in new contexts to render unseen injustices visible or identifying 
additional examples of virtue, with varying success. Concepts are used in politics and 
reconfirmed as political concepts when they are mapped onto societal terrains in 
innovative and controversial ways.  
The concepts that we need to reflect upon political principles and procedures, 
then, are inhabited by disagreements and do not go unused in contentious arguments. If 
the interest in the topic of political concepts has nonetheless remained rather modest, it is 
perhaps because most political theorists have been keen to study more comprehensive 
structures such as ideologies, discourses, or normative vocabularies, in which individual 
concepts appear as interconnected elements.  
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